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frame to file the a notice of appeal has begun. However, given the structure of 
procedures set forth for a party to submit a proposed order, with the opposing party given 
the opportunity to object thereto, and having the order entered by the Court at a later date, 
such a standard is untenable. 
Put simply, despite the date of the submission of an order, a party is entitled to the 
statutorily allowed time frame from the date the order is actually entered to file a notice of 
appeal Any other holding must be error as a matter of law. 
In the case at hand, Appellant contacted the Court within the 30 days allowed to 
file a notice of appeal. At that time, Appellant was provided incorrect information which 
it relied on to its detriment. But for the incorrect information, which was obtained from 
the Court within the 30 days permitted to file an appeal, the Notice of Appeal could have 
and would have been timely. 
B. The Trust's Motion Was Specifically Directed By The Supreme Court 
Appellee argues that the Appellate Court may affirm a ruling on any grounds 
presented to the District Court, whether relied upon by the District Court or not. In this 
regard, Appellee argues that the underlying Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal 
was untimely itself, and therefore the Court may elect to affirm the decision on the 
grounds that the Motion was untimely. While Appellee's argument may technically be 
true, given the facts of this case, the argument flies in the face of logic. Why would 
Appellant file a Motion requesting an extension of time to file an appeal it believed was 
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argument that the unique circumstances doctrine applies to the facts of this case. Indeed, 
the cases cited by Appellee support Appellant's position. It is "in the best interests of 
justice" to allow this appeal. The unique circumstances of relying directly on information 
provided by the Court, to the detriment of Appellant, demonstrate that not only does 
justice suggest the appeal should be allowed, justice demands it should be allowed. 
D, The District Court Improperly Denied The Motion To Reconsider 
As set forth in Appellant's opening brief, the denial of the Motion to Reconsider 
was an abuse of discretion by Judge Peuler. The facts present in this case clearly 
mandated that the Court permit the Appeal and grant the Motion for an Extension of Time 
to file the appeal. Judge Peuler's refusal to do so, when presented with the relevant facts 
and law, was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Appellant's opening brief, 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the findings of the District Court 
and remand this case to the District Court with instructions to permit the Robertson 
Family Trust leave for an extension of time to renew their Appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of July, 2000 
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